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AN OUTLINE OF RECENT EVENTTS 
 
he direction of political changes in 
Poland has recently been debated in the 
European Parliament. Here, in a nutshell, 
is the chronicle of relevant events. In 2015 
elections, a previously unknown candidate 
Andrzej Duda won the presidency while Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) received the 
plurality of votes. Two new parties, Kukiz-15 
and Nowoczesna.pl, gained substantial presence 
in the parliament. Significantly, after a twenty-
five-year presence on the Polish political scene, 
the SLD (former communist) party did not make 
it to the parliament, while the PSL (People’s 
Party) barely reached the election threshold. 
Two small parties, Razem and Korwin, reached 
the 3 percent election threshold, which made 
them eligible for budgetary subsidies for parties; 
however, their role is negligible. These changes 
can be compared with the 2001 elections when 
the AWS and UW parties did not even enter the 
parliament, and the new parties that did were 
Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform), Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość, Samoobrona (Self-Defense), 
and Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish 
Families). After the 2005 election Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość had to enter a coalition with 
Samoobrona and Liga Polskich Rodzin to form a 
government. These two small parties are now 
extinct. In 2007 a new coalition of Platforma 
Obywatelska and PSL was formed. The coalition 
ruled for eight years and was defeated in the 
2015 election.   
The 2015 competition had its dark horse: Paweł 
Kukiz, who unexpectedly took third place in the 
first round of the presidential election. The 
slogan “fighting the system” gained him the 
votes of people who viewed the coalition 
government of PO and PSL critically, but were 
not supportive of PiS. What is perplexing about 
the phenomenon of Kukiz’s success is that his 
slogan of “fighting the system” enjoyed instant 
popularity, even though the “system” remained 
undefined, as did the methods of fighting it. The 
fiasco of the referendum on the single-member 
constituencies, which the Kukiz party advocated 
supports that view. As we observe the public 
debate, we conclude that PO seems to be at a 
loss as to why it lost the election, PiS why it 
won, and the Kukiz-15 why it made it to 
parliament to begin with.1   
DEMOCRATIC VERSUS OLIGARCHIC CAPITALISM  
In order to explain the turn of events in Poland I 
focus on the concept of the system while using 
the theses and theoretical assumptions of the 
social theory that can be named non-Marxian 
historical materialism.2 In light of that theory 
politics, economy, and culture constitute 
autonomous but similarly organized realms of 
public life. In each of them social minorities 
emerge that maximize their specific interests: 
power regulation, profit, and spiritual 
supremacy, respectively. The foundation for the 
appearance of social classes is material social 
means. In politics they are means of coercion. 
Depending on the position with respect to those 
means, two social classes can be distinguished: a 
class of rulers that decides how to use and 
distribute them, and a class of citizens that does 
not have that ability. In the realm of economy 
people are either owners or direct producers, 
according to their access to the means of 
production. In culture there are two social 
classes, defined by their relationship to the 
means of persuasion (television, radio, press, 
and the Internet): the “priests” who decide which 
ideas are to be popularized, and the “followers” 
who do not have that power. These antagonistic 
pairs of social classes have contradictory 
interests: the rulers aim at maximizing power 
regulation, and citizens at maximizing social 
autonomy; owners tend to maximize profit, 
employees their own income; “priests” want the 
greatest possible spiritual domination and 
“believers” spiritual autonomy.  
In terms of the social theory assumed here, 
democracy can be defined as a class-balanced 
society in which the classes of rulers, owners, 
and “priests” have similar influence and are able 
to realize their social interests without the 
support of the other dominant social classes.3 
Social conflicts between rulers and citizens (in 
politics), owners and direct producers (in the 
T 
September 2016                                                                                                                   THE SARMATIAN REVIEW 
 
 2024 
economy), and “priests” and “followers” (in 
culture) are solved by way of compromises and 
of concessions made by the dominant classes on 
behalf of the dominated. Moreover, the state of 
social peace is strengthened by class alliances 
formed across the power line, whereby a class 
that is dominant in one realm of life offers 
support to a class that is dominated in a different 
domain.  
For example, rulers intervene in economic life 
and support direct producers in their conflict 
with owners, in this way contributing to social 
peace in the economy. Owners, on the other 
hand, counterbalance the rulers’ advantage over 
citizens by helping the latter class limit the 
power of the former, bolstering social peace in 
politics. In turn, social peace in both the political 
and social realms facilitates social peace 
between “priests” and “followers.” Peace in that 
realm is conditional upon the dispersed 
distribution of the means of indoctrination, 
which ensures world-view and ideological 
pluralism.  
It can be assumed that democratic capitalism 
is an empirical approximation of a class-
balanced society. In that form of government 
everyone has the right to free elections, the 
creation of political parties, private property, the 
creation of labor unions, and the freedom of 
belief and religion. That fragile social balance 
can be disturbed by a “horizontal” direction of 
social alliances formed not by a dominant and a 
dominated social class, as is the case in a class-
balanced society, but between the dominant 
classes.  
For example, owners in economic-political 
oligarchization reach for political support of 
their interests. That support can be given in 
various forms. Rulers can limit the role of labor 
unions, regulate the relationships between 
employers and employees, lower the costs of 
production (tax exemptions), or secure the 
realization of extraordinary profits (concessions, 
public procurements). Rulers may use the 
owners’ material resources to weaken the 
control exerted over their own class by the civil 
society. For instance, since the high costs of 
running a political campaign can only be 
covered by political parties with sufficient 
financial means, new political parties are at a 
significant disadvantage in their competition 
with the established ones. That restricts the 
political market to a limited choice of 
candidates.  
The oligarchization of the political and 
economic realms also has a negative influence 
on ideological and worldview pluralism. Rulers 
set the fees for radio and television broadcast 
licenses and determine, together with 
entrepreneurs, where advertisements will be 
placed. The oligarchization of social life is also 
manifested in economic scandals, corruption, 
clientelism, or favoritism, which distort 
competition in the political, economic, and 
media markets.   
In an oligarchic society the clashing interests of 
rulers and citizens, owners and direct producers, 
priests and believers are reconciled by 
disadvantaging lower classes  by limiting their 
autonomy, income, and intellectual freedom 
which adds fuel to the social conflict. Such 
oligarchization of social life leads to the 
creation of what was called a “system” in the 
2015 election campaign. The beginnings of 
the system reach as far back as 1989, when 
Polish capitalism assumed, from its very 
beginning, the oligarchic form.4 The core of 
this oligarchization was the process of the 
“enfranchisement of the nomenklatura.” It can 
be defined as “the exchange of current political 
privileges, associated with the position of a 
person in the administrative hierarchy of the 
political apparatus, for economic capital.”5 The 
main shareholders of nomenklatura companies 
were people from the ruling milieu––the higher 
officials of the Polish United Workers’ Party and 
the administrative workers of the state––who 
became the actual owners of state assets with 
only a small financial input. A new company, 
entering into an agreement with the mother 
company, took over some of its assets: office 
space, warehouses, know-how, technological 
lines. The new nomenklatura company 
specialized in the same branch of production 
as the mother company and took over some of 
its orders and clients and, consequently, 
profits. These initiatives served the purpose of 
transferring capital from the state sector to the 
private one, which would have been impossible 




if the people doing so did not have the political 
influence to ensure the stability and safety of the 
transfer. As a result of these processes, corrupt 
privatization and corrupt-clientelist economy 
took root.6 
This was facilitated by the shock therapy of 
economic reforms that have drastically lowered 
employee income and excluded a significant part 
of society from participation in the transfer of 
ownership. For example, in January 1990 
industrial production declined by over 30 
percent and the national income fell by 11 
percent. In the years 1990–1991 the real income 
from work on individual farms plummeted to 
40.3 percent and employee salaries decreased to 
65.9 percent.7 The liberalization of foreign trade 
resulted in a flood of cheap foreign products and 
contributed to the bankruptcy of national 
producers who were not able to withstand the 
competition, as well as to unemployment.  In the 
years 1990–1992 the number of unemployed 
rose to three million people. According to 
Tadeusz Kowalik, it was “not so much a 
transformation-related recession, perceived as 
the inevitable cost of great changes, but a 
recessive transformation, i.e., a great social 
change effected by means of a recession as a 
tool for creating a polarized society.”8  
The assumed model of privatization favored 
foreign capital and obstructed the formation of a 
domestic class of capitalists, other than those 
related to the state apparatus. According to 
Kazimierz Poznański’s calculation, state assets 
were sold for about 9 to 12 percent of their free-
market  value.9 The shortcomings of domestic 
industry are reflected in the structure of Polish 
exports, of which the share of the profits from 
the sale of advanced technologies is presently 7 
percent of GDP (in Germany it is 16 percent).10 
Additionally, capitalism without domestic 
owners is less sensitive to employee pressure or 
state regulations. The data of the National Labor 
Inspectorate show that during the first decade of 
transition two-thirds of the controlled companies 
did not pay salaries to their employees on time 
and did not have a union organization.11 
Stanisław Gomułka estimates that the 
productivity of Polish employees is equal to 
two-thirds of the productivity of employees in 
Western countries, while Polish salaries only 
reach one-fourth of the salaries there.12 That 
disparity is also reflected in the percentage of 
employee salaries in the Polish GDP, 35.6 
percent, while in Germany it is 51 percent and in 
Denmark 59 percent.13 The so-called “trash 
agreements” (umowy śmieciowe) that offer no 
benefits are becoming an increasingly popular 
form of employment in Poland. Two million 
Poles have emigrated for economic reasons. The 
growing income inequality is not balanced by 
social spending, which is well below the 
European average and constitutes 18.1 percent 
of the Polish GDP compared to 29.5 percent in 
Germany and 34.6 percent in Denmark.14  
IS CAPITAL THE ONLY THING THAT DOES NOT 
HAVE A MOTHER COUNTRY? ABOUT NATIONAL 
AND TRANSNATIONAL CLASSES  
In the last decade in Poland the oligarchization 
of capitalism has aggravated economic and 
social divisions and confirmed the peripheral 
position of the Polish economy in the 
international system of the division of work. 
That phenomenon has not been eliminated by 
the accession of Poland to the European Union. 
Furthermore, globalization and integration 
processes have generated a new social 
phenomenon: the separation of the heretofore 
uniform national and supranational social 
classes. Generally speaking, members of a 
dominant social class (rulers, owners, and 
“priests”) realize their social interests primarily 
within their national society that constitutes a 
natural reference point for them. The scope of 
the realization of interests of a particular social 
class is the result of the forces of juxtaposing the 
social classes operating in a particular realm of 
national social life: rulers and citizens in 
politics, owners and direct producers in the 
economy, “priests” and “followers” in culture.    
The creation of the transnational classes changes 
the mechanism of realization of interests of the 
particular social classes.  This realization is not a 
vector of the social forces of antagonistic classes 
within one national society, but a consequence 
of the global social interest of a transnational 
class to whose wishes the local social classes 
have to adapt. In conditions of globalization the 
movements originating in one nation only have a 
small chance of succeeding. The pace and scope 
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of emerging national and transnational classes 
vary depending on the realm of social life. For 
example, global corporations invest and move 
their operations to countries in which the local 
authorities offer the most attractive conditions 
such as cheap labor, tax exemption, and 
desirable regulations of economic activity. 
These globalization processes have brought 
about the dominance of foreign capital in the 
Polish economy. Foreign entities have a 60 
percent share in the Polish banking sector, 
compared to 5 percent in Germany and 10 
percent in Denmark.15 Over 83 percent of the 
largest Polish companies are owned by 
foreign entities.16 Bartłomiej Radziejewski 
estimates that “in the years 2001–2003, six 
billion zloties were siphoned off from Poland. In 
the following three years this sum grew to 29 
billion zloties, and in the last three years, 56 
billion.”17 In 2013 the economic entities with 
foreign capital took 82 million zloties out of the 
Polish economy, which is equivalent to 5 
percent of GDP.18  
In the cultural realm there also are national 
and transnational classes of “priests.”  While 
they make the decisions about which ideas, 
views, information, and comments are to be 
popularized, they are not the authors of these 
ideas or information.19 They transfer a part of 
their decision-making power to people who 
realize the assigned tasks of media production. 
These people are editors, department managers, 
and journalists who, by being employed in 
media belonging to foreign capital, become the 
local link of the chain of the transnational class 
of “media priests.”  
Let us consider an example pertaining to the 
press market. In 2014 746 million copies of 
various press publications were sold in Poland. 
They were published by nineteen media 
concerns, of which nine were foreign and ten 
Polish. Foreign publishers own 138 magazines, 
with a total circulation of 567 million copies, 
while Polish publishers own 47 titles with a total 
circulation of 178 million copies. Thus 76 
percent of the Polish press market is 
controlled by foreign-funded entities, while 
domestic entities have only a 24 percent share of 
the market.20   
The Bauer Media concern has a 39 percent share 
in the Polish press market. It publishes thirty-
nine magazines specializing in luxury, advice, 
youth, computer, and women’s issues. The 
Swiss and German concern Ringier Axel 
Springer, with a 16 percent share of the market, 
publishes sports, information, social and key 
political periodicals such as Fakt and Newsweek 
Polska. The German concern Verlagsgruppe 
Passau, with a 15 percent share of the Polish 
market, virtually monopolizes the local press 
owning twenty out of the twenty-four most 
popular regional daily newspapers in fifteen 
voivodeships. These three German publishers 
control 70 percent of the Polish press market. As 
regards the Internet, foreign capital owns the 
three largest Internet portals.  Onet.pl is 
owned by Ringier Axel Springer; Wirtualna 
Polska by four shareholders: European Media 
Holding, Orfe S.A., 10xS.A., and Albemuth 
Inwestycje; while Interia belongs to Bauer 
Media. These three portals are visited by 42 
million people each month. 
The media influence should not be understood in 
simplistic terms.  A newspaper published by a 
German concern does not have to automatically 
represent the German point of view, however it 
is understood.  Before arriving at such 
conclusions, a comprehensive analysis of the 
content produced by the foreign-owed media 
should be made. To my knowledge, this has not 
yet been undertaken by anyone. But some 
conclusions can be drawn. For instance, the 
influence of foreign capital on the Polish media 
market is reflected in the way the aim of the 
publishing activity is enforced. The first 
criterion of the selection of content of a 
newspaper is its potential profitability. The 
information most likely to be published is that 
which is likely to be interesting to a wide 
audience, not that which is socially valuable but 
less likely to attract attention.  Consequently the 
foreign-owned media tend to trivialize issues of 
long-term importance to Poland and highlight 
inconsequential issues that distract and entertain 
citizens.  
In the political realm, the network of EU 
institutions is becoming an autonomous 
environment in which the transnational political 
class is formed. The administration of the 




European Union consumes 6 percent of its 
annual budget and employs 89,000 people. In 
2013 there were 32,000 administrative 
employees in the Directorates-General of the 
European Commission, one thousand in the 
European Parliament, and five thousand in EU 
agencies. The politicians from various European 
countries who enter the structures of European 
bureaucracy become members of the 
supranational political class. The position and 
chances for advancement in its hierarchy depend 
on how efficiently the directives coming from 
Brussels are realized in these politicians' 
countries of origin. In contrast, the national 
fraction of the rulers’ class maximizes its 
influence in its national society. It is in its 
interest to strengthen and protect the sovereignty 
of the nation state.  
The process of the creation of a supranational 
rulers’ class is still in statu nascendi because the 
creation of a rulers’ class presupposes, by 
definition, possessing the appropriate means of 
coercion. For the time being, the transnational 
class does not have such hard means of 
influence at its disposal. This is why it is in its 
interest that the new rulers come from the two 
strongest countries of the European Union: 
Germany and France, who also have the 
strongest military. However, these rulers will not 
abandon the interests of their particular 
countries. The end result is that they support 
those aspects of European integration that are 
profitable for their countries of origin. This is 
characteristic of Germany in particular. The 
transnational rulers’ class already possesses a 
strong arsenal of soft coercive means, ranging 
from public admonitions to threats of sanctions 
and the withdrawal of financing for economic 
projects that can be used against recalcitrant 
national authorities, as has been the case with 
Hungary.  
WHO STANDS TO LOSE AND WHO STANDS TO 
GAIN FROM THE POWER CHANGES IN POLAND?  
The intensity of the political arguments 
concerning the Constitutional Tribunal in 
Poland may seem incomprehensible to those 
who have taken the trouble to study its 
history and limited importance.  Over the last 
twenty-five years this institution has only had a 
corrective function in the legislative work of the 
Sejm. Briefly said, the issue is power rather than 
the marginalization of the court.  
In order to correctly assess the current political 
conflict in Poland, it is necessary to take a look 
at the nature of a political party.  The activity of 
each political party reflects two types of 
interests. The first is political in nature: it is 
the maximization of power within the party. 
That interest is realized in the relationships 
between the particular components of the party’s 
leadership (the leader plus the elite plus the 
party apparatus) and ordinary party members. 
Members of the party elite are loyal to the leader 
in return for expected political profits. When a 
party is in opposition the reward can be, for 
instance, being placed in an appropriate position 
on an electoral list (in the election to the 
European Parliament, the national parliament, a 
regional parliament, a city council, or a gmina 
council); or, after a victory in the election, being 
employed in the office of a parliamentary 
member. The loyalty of the local party apparatus 
to the party elite and the loyalty of ordinary 
party members to the local party apparatus are 
based on the same principle. However, the lower 
position in the party hierarchy the smaller the 
expected political profits and, therefore, the 
lower the loyalty of party members to their 
leaders. When a party wins a parliamentary 
election, it gains access to a new field of power 
regulation. The elite of the party becomes the 
elite of the state, which decides who will occupy 
a certain number of government jobs. This set of 
positions can always be broadened by creating 
new institutions or by reforming the old ones.  
The second type of interest in a democratic 
state system is realized in the relationship 
between the party and its electorate because in 
order to win an election and power and to be 
able to put selected people in government jobs, 
the party must mobilize its grassroots members 
and gain the support of the majority or at least 
plurality of voters. For that purpose it must 
construct such a political program containing 
political, socioeconomic, and socio-ideological 
components as will mobilize party members and 
motivate citizens to vote for the party. 
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The main beneficiaries of political changes 
are the party elites. Even if political changes 
improve the functioning of the state, which 
translates into advantages for citizens, it is the 
party leadership that will be in charge of 
implementing the proposed changes. They will 
become the leaders of the state.  The 
socioeconomic and socioideological parts of 
political programs are addressed to citizens, with 
the view of ensuring reelection.  
From the point of view of non-Marxian 
historical materialism we can distinguish three 
basic varieties of party programs with respect to 
the economic realm and the same number with 
respect to the cultural realm. As regards the 
economy, a leftist socioeconomic program 
presumes increasing that part of the social 
income that is used for the benefit of employees, 
as well as strengthening employee rights in 
relation to their employers; a rightist program 
presumes deregulating the economy by lowering 
taxes, which is beneficial for the owners’ class; 
and a centrist program attempts to reconcile the 
interests of the two classes.  By analogy, from 
the cultural point of view we can distinguish 
conservative, liberal, and centrist socio-
ideological programs. A conservative program 
allows the state to support a certain set of social 
ideas and functional approaches with a view to 
preserving society as a whole. A liberal program 
leaves the issue of propagating ideas and 
attitudes to individual citizens. A centrist one 
incorporates both tendencies.  
Let us now consider the relationship between the 
maximization of political and social interests of 
various classes comprising the party electorate. 
Since voter support is necessary to gain power in 
a democracy, in the long run the maximization 
of political interest to the exclusion of voters’ 
interest is not in the best interest of a party. If a 
political party which has taken over the 
leadership of a state begins to prioritize its 
influence in the state administration over the 
realization of the voters’ interests, it will lose to 
the opposing political party in the nearest 
election.  A party with a long-run perspective, 
including the upcoming elections, will be aware 
of the fact that the realization of political 
interests must be mitigated and social interest 
must be taken into account if the party is to be 
successful.  
Therefore the dispute about the Constitutional 
Tribunal in Poland should be seen as a typical 
political dispute between the party that has 
lost the majority in the parliament and the 
party that has gained it and, as a result, has the 
power to fill posts in the state administration. 
During the eight years PO was in power, it 
nominated fourteen out of fifteen judges in 
the Constitutional Tribunal. Before the end of 
the term of office of the old Sejm, on the 
occasion of the amendment of the Constitutional 
Tribunal law, an additional five judges were 
selected whose terms of office were to begin 
with the term of office of the new Sejm, i.e., in 
November and December, upon expiration of the 
term of some of the present judges. In that way, 
fourteen judges nominated by PO would still be 
members of the fifteen-person Constitutional 
Tribunal. The PO obviously intended to use the 
Constitutional Tribunal to retain political power 
after the anticipated electoral loss.  
An amendment of the law introduced by PiS 
restricted the number of PO-nominated judges 
from fourteen to nine. The solutions suggested 
by PiS on that occasion were not dissimilar from 
the solutions adopted in other European 
countries. As regards the entities that nominate 
the judges in a constitutional tribunal, the term 
of office of those judges, and their competence, 
different solutions have been adopted in the 
constitutions of various European countries that 
have that institution (some do not). The judges 
of a constitutional tribunal can be nominated by 
the president, senate, parliament, or a self-
governing council of judges. The idea of moving 
the Constitutional Tribunal outside of Warsaw, 
criticized in the mainstream media, was inspired 
by Germany, where the seat of the 
Constitutional Tribunal is in Karlsruhe.   
Also, a conflict similar to the Polish one 
regarding the filling of three posts in a 
Constitutional Tribunal, which lasted about a 
year and a half, occurred in Italy without 
attracting attention from any European 
institution. No member of the Italian Parliament 




or the European Commission demanded a debate 
concerning the condition of democracy in Italy, 
or a new election, or the monitoring of the 
situation in that country. Let us also remember 
that a country such as the United Kingdom does 
not have a constitution at all, yet no one accuses 
that monarchy of being undemocratic.  
The one-sided engagement of foreign and 
national mainstream media in the dispute 
surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal is 
therefore greatly disturbing. The prime ministers 
of Luxemburg and Austria, president of the 
European Parliament Martin Schulz, and 
president of the liberal fraction in the European 
Parliament Guy Verhofstadt are on record for 
recommending actions against Poland that 
cannot be accommodated in the original plan for 
the European Union. The numerous 
demonstrations organized in Poland and abroad 
under the slogan “defense of democracy” and 
the recurring demand for preterm elections 
indicate that the issue is something more than an 
ordinary political conflict between the winning 
and the losing party about the filling of posts.  
My thesis is that the taking over of power by 
PiS not only limits the scope of the political 
influence of the previously ruling party––which 
is a standard outcome of a change of power in 
democracies––but also threatens the interests 
of other social classes in Poland and abroad. 
The political change achieved by the PiS 
victory is much deeper than commonly 
assumed. It is not only a matter of power being 
taken over by a single party for the first time 
since 1989; this time power went from the 
fraction of rulers oriented toward the 
transnational rulers’ class to a nationally-
oriented fraction of rulers who promise a 
significant redistribution of political power, 
economic profits, and intellectual influence. If 
we assume that the above interpretation is 
correct, then the answer to the question of who 
lost when PiS came to power is as follows. 
1. The transnational fraction of the rulers’ 
class. The taking of power by PiS posits a threat 
to the scope of the regulations of the 
supranational rulers’ class because Poland will 
not be as willing to realize the recommendations 
coming from Brussels as it used to be (e.g., the 
recommendation concerning the acceptance of 
refugees according to an imposed algorithm). 
Bearing that in mind, it is no wonder that 
President of the European Parliament Martin 
Schulz commented angrily that what has 
happened in Poland is a kind of a coup d'état. 
Such remarks are not motivated by his 
Polonophobia but by his interests: if PiS retains 
power, Poland may become less dependent on 
Brussels and follow the example of Hungary. It 
is symptomatic that the postulate of shortening 
the term of office of the Polish Sejm surfaced 
during a demonstration of the recently created 
“Committee for the Defense of Democracy” 
(Komitet Obrony Demokracji), and that it took 
place in the capital of Germany. 
2. The transnational fraction of the owners’ 
class. According to the data quoted above, 
foreign entities have recently transferred 82 
billion zloties out of the Polish economy, which 
amounts to 5 percent of the Polish GDP. The 
promised banking and supermarket taxes, as 
well as a restriction of VAT exemptions, will 
definitely restrict the profits of the supranational 
owners’ class. 
3. The transnational fraction of the media 
“priests”’ class. The announced intention of a 
“repolonization” of the media and a change in 
the advertising policies of government 
institutions and agencies will limit the foreign 
media companies’ profits from advertising. In 
the years 2010–2014 the twelve Polish ministers 
spent about 260 million zloties on 
advertisements in the press, radio, television, 
and the Internet––twice as much as all the 
governments in the years 2006–2010. The 
following foreign companies are examples of 
income acquired via Polish government 
advertising: Axel Springer (3.2 million zloties); 
Verlagsgruppe Passau (2.6 million zloties); 
Bauer Media Polska, the owner of the RMF 
radio (1.9 million zloties); and the French media 
concern Groupe Lagardere, the owner of Radio 
Zet, Plus, and Antyradio (5.3 million zloties).21 
The ministries of the Polish government have 
placed commercials in foreign television 
networks as well: in CNN (amounting to 5.6 
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million zloties), France (1.25 million zloties), 
Financial Times (568 thousand zloties), The 
Economist (410 thousand zloties), and 
International Herald Tribune  (184 thousand 
zloties).  
4.  The national fractions of the classes of 
rulers, “priests,” and owners.  I have already 
mentioned the political damage to the party that 
has lost the election. The new rulers have 
announced a change in the advertising policies 
in national media. For example, in the years 
2010–2014 13.8 million zloties was spent on 
advertising in TVN and 8.5 million in Polsat 
(with comparable viewership), while the Agora 
Company earned 5 million zloties.22 Those 
amounts may now go to other media, the 
sympathies of which are more in line with those 
of the ruling party. The announcement of 
changes in the tax law and the intention to 
scrutinize the decisions about VAT exemptions, 
which have amounted to a budgetary loss of 52 
billion zloties, or 3 percent of the GDP,23 may 
limit the income of the businessmen associated 
with the previously ruling party.  
WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN POLAND? AN ATTEMPT 
AT A PROGNOSIS  
We do not know if the coming to power of PiS 
will change the direction of the redistribution of 
political power, economic profits, and 
intellectual influence. There are three possible 
scenarios that can follow.  
1. A pessimistic one. The activity of PiS will be 
restricted to the realization of the political and 
socioideological components of its program. The 
control over government institutions, intensified 
by competition within the party, will lead to 
unrestrained replacement of “people from the 
previous coalition” with “our people” in an 
increasing number of these institutions.  That 
will reinforce the division into “us” and “them,” 
leading to growing resentment by members of 
the losing party, their families, and their friends, 
which will exacerbate the state of social conflict 
already fueled by the hostile media environment.  
The conflict could be further aggravated by the 
realization of a cultural policy consisting in 
“wars” on new fronts. Such a policy will result 
in the division of people into those who realize 
the flagship projects of the winning party (e.g., 
the Museum of Polish History or the Museum of 
the “Cursed Soldiers” in Ostrołęka) and those 
who will not be able to receive adequate support 
because they are not associated with the current 
ruling class. 
2.  A realistic one.  Having established control 
over some government institutions and agencies, 
PiS will realize those elements of the socio-
economic program that will ensure the support 
of the key electorate (e.g., the newly passed bill 
of 500 zloties a month for the second child and 
further children tax-free). The party will also try 
to find a modus vivendi with regard to some in 
the leftist-liberal environment, contributing to its 
neutralization.  
3. An optimistic one. Having established control 
over selected state institutions and agencies, PiS 
will put into practice the social elements of its 
socioeconomic program and will introduce 
changes in the industry to make economic 
development more dynamic, stimulating the 
creation of new technologies and workplaces. 
The restoration of economic independence will 
require cooperation with academics and gaining 
the favor, or at least indifference of some leftist-
liberal intellectual and artistic circles.   
The realization of the first scenario will lead to 
an electoral failure in the 2019 election. The 
realization of the second scenario will ensure a 
majority in the parliament, making it possible to 
continue governing. The realization of the third 
scenario will allow the party to gain a majority, 
which will make it possible to change the 
constitution. 
At present, PiS is at the stage of implementing 
its political interests and taking control over the 
state institutions. The mistakes its inexperienced 
ministers make (e.g., Minister Waszczykowski’s 
unfortunate phrasing in an interview with a 
German paper), repeated by the hostile media, 
unnecessarily antagonize groups of voters. If 
these are only due to a lack of experience, there 
is a chance that they will be eliminated. 




However, the situation will be worse if they are 
manifestations of a competition for political 
influence and posts in which PiS politicians play 
up to the expectations of their electorates 
without regard for the party’s reputation and for 
Poland’s interests.  
We can be sure of one thing. The reconstruction 
of the Polish political scene is a symptom of the 
diminishing development potential of the 
transformation that has taken place since 1989. 
The welfare state that has been maintained 
functioned only for the ruling classes. As 
regards the masses, the state only performed the 
function of a guard protecting the privileges of 
the oligarchy. The masses now demand change. 
The parties and intellectual circles that will 
correctly diagnose Poland’s economic, political, 
and cultural problems and propose viable 
solutions stand to gain in the Polish political 
scene.                    ∆ 
NOTES 
	  
                                                
1 One proof of that is what Witold Waszczykowski, 
the foreign minister of the new government, has said: 
“It is our only wish to cure our country of a few 
diseases so that it can recover. The previous 
government engaged [the media] in the realization of 
a specific concept of leftist politics, as if the world 
had to move according to the Marxist pattern, in one 
direction only: that of a new mixture of cultures and 
races, a world consisting of cyclists and vegetarians 
who only use renewable energy sources and who 
oppose any expression of religion. That has nothing 
to do with the traditional Polish values.” Ł.Warzecha, 
“Waszczykowski trafia w dziesiątkę czyli o 
weganach i rowerzystach,” in: wpolityce.pl 
<http://wPolityce.pl/polityka/277078-
waszczykowski-trafia-w-dziesiatke-czyli-o-
weganach-i-rowerzystach>, accessed 5 January 2016. 
However, both that statement and the supportive 
journalist’s comment tell us nothing about the 
economic reasons for voting for PiS, which were 
highlighted in the political program of the party and 
presented during the election campaign. As a 
follower of the campaign, I do not recall any 
promises made by the party to challenge Polish 
culinary traditions or to destroy bicycle paths.    
2 L.  Nowak, U podstaw teorii socjalizmu, vol. 1: 
Własność i władza. Poznań: Nakom, 1991, pp. 167–
182.  
                                                                       
3 This topic has been elaborated on in K. Brzechczyn, 
“Upadek realnego socjalizmu w Europie Wschodniej 
a załamanie się hiszpańskiego imperium 
kolonialnego w Ameryce Łacińskiej. Próba analizy 
porównawczej,” in: K. Brzechczyn, editor, Ścieżki 
transformacji. Ujęcia teoretyczne i opisy empiryczne. 
Poznań: Zysk i Ska, 2003; and “Dziedzictwo 
Solidarności a przebieg transformacji ustrojowej w 
Polsce,”  in: J. R. Sielezin, M. Golińczak, editors, 
Solidarność i opozycja polityczna w Europie 
Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 80. XX wieku.  
Wrocław: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2012, 
pp. 217–240.  
4 K. Brzechczyn, “O ewolucji społeczeństw 
socjalistycznych. Próba wstępnej konceptualizacji,” 
in: T. Grabińska, M. Zabierowski, editors, Analizy 
metodologiczne w nauce. Wrocław: Oficyna 
Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej, 1997, pp. 
105–121; K. Brzechczyn,  Kłopoty z Polską. Wybór 
publicystyki politycznej. Poznań: WiS, 1998; K. 
Brzechczyn, “Kompromis przy Okrągłym Stole. 
Próba modelu,” in: K. Brzechczyn, editor, 
Interpretacje upadku komunizmu w Polsce i w 
Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Poznań: IPN, 2011, 
pp. 87–107. 
5 P. Strzałkowski, “Polityczne i społeczne 
uwarunkowania przedsiębiorczości ekonomicznej,” 
in: W. W. Morawski, editor, Zmierzch socjalizmu 
państwowego. Warsaw: PWN, 1994, p. 349.  
6 T. Kowalik, “Polska transformacja,” 
<www.polskatransformacja.pl>, Warsaw: Muza, 
2009, p. 152. 
7 Ibid., p. 168. 
8 Ibid., p. 104. 
9 K. Poznański, Wielki przekręt. Klęska polskich 
reform. Warsaw: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze i 
Literackie,  2000, pp. 40–41. 
10 M. Malinowski, “Odzyskać państwo,” Nowy 
Obywatel. Pismo na Rzecz Sprawiedliwości 
Społecznej, no. 17 (68), 2005, p. 17. 
11 T, Kowalik, op. cit., p. 153. 
12 I quote the data from A. Szahaj’s work, Inny 
kapitalizm jest możliwy. Warsaw: Książka i Prasa, 
2015, pp.  67, 127–133. 
13 M. Malinowski, Odzyskać państwo, p. 17. 
14 Ibid. 
15 M. Malinowski, Odzyskać państwo, p. 17. 
16 B. Radziejowski, “Renta neokolonialna, czyli ile 
jeszcze Polak zapłaci,” Nowa Konfederacja. 
Internetowy Miesięcznik Idei, no. 2 (53), 2014, p. 3. 
17 Ibid.,  p. 4; also “Koszmarny rachunek za 
bezmyślną prywatyzację. Z prof. Jerzym Żyżyńskim 
rozmawia Aleksandra Rybińska,”  Nowa 
Konfederacja, no. 2 (53), 2014, p. 3. 
18 B. Radziejowski, “Renta neokolonialna,” p. 3. 
September 2016                                                                                                                   THE SARMATIAN REVIEW 
 
 2032 
                                                                       
19 I rely on K. Niedźwiadek’s “Struktura i rozwój 
momentu produkcji duchowej,” in:  P. Buczkowski 
and A. Klawiter, editors, Klasy – światopogląd – 
idealizacja, Poznań: PWN, 1985, pp. 17–46.   
20 P. Grzegorczyk, Czy musimy repolonizować 
media? Analiza zagranicznego kapitału w mediach, 
in: Jagielloński24.pl  
<http://Jagiellonski24.pl/2015/09/14/czy-musimy-
repolonizowac-media-analiza-zagranicznego-
kapitalu-w-polsce>, accessed 5 January 2015. 
21 P. Grzegorczyk, Media na państwowym garnuszku. 




instytucji-publicznych-na-reklamy>, accessed 5 
January 2016.  
22 P. Grzegorczyk, Media na państwowym garnuszku. 
23 Z. Kuźmiuk, “Sejmowa komisja śledcza w sprawie 






rozwiazaniach-zyskiwal,  accessed 5 January 2016.  
According to the Global Financial Integrity report, 
“foreign companies illegally siphon about 90 billion 
zloties a year out of Poland, i.e. 5 percent of our 
GDP, mainly by way of frauds concerning VAT, 
CIT, and customs.” Quoted from Z. Kuźmiuk, 
“Polska wśród 20 najbardziej ‘okradanych’ państw 
świata,” in: wpolityce.pl 
http://wPolityce.pl/gospodarka/276449-polska-
wsrod-20-najbardziej-okradanych-panstw-swiata>, 
accessed 5 January 2016.    
 
 
The First World War  




Translated by Adrian Lukas Smith 
 
At the end of October 1918, after four years of 
war, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy collapsed. 
The army from the front changed into a horde of 
displaced persons wanting to return home as 
quickly as possible. The legal authorities 
perished into ash, blasted away by a hurricane of 
                                                                       
enjoyment and rebellion blowing through the 
constituent countries of the Austro-Hungarian 
empire and nations of the dying Holy Roman 
Empire. It acted from Trieste to Suczawa, from 
Bregenz to Dolna Watra. Galicia and Lodomeria 
and the principalities of Oświęcim, Zator, and 
Kraków resisted being taken over. The coup 
occurred quickly and almost without pain. 
Authority was grasped by people who were 
more clever and more experienced in 
underground work. Secret organizations 
appeared. There were new faces and new heroes, 
as well as demonstrations, oaths, rallies, 
outbursts of patriotism, garrulousness, and 
improvisation. New homelands were born, 
former officers of the monarchy stepped down 
quietly and silently; they were disheartened 
because of the coup's lack of order, the unjust 
contempt for bureaucracy. Amateurs grasped 
governance. Young people persuaded the army 
to give up their weapons because the army was 
tired and had been waiting for this for a long 
time. Hearts rose. New countries began on their 
journey to the unknown in this intoxicated, 
anarchic world. 
Zakopane entered this new epoch beautifully. 
The people proclaimed: we no longer have an 
Austrian monarchy! The power of governance 
was deposited in the hands of a writer. It was not 
offered to Piłsudski’s Legion or to professional 
Sokół patriots, or to a lawyer or doctor, but to 
the writer Stefan Żeromski. I am not sure 
whether this action came from the ghosts of the 
dying epoch or whether it initiated new times. 
We know how writers gradually lose their 
importance. At that time, despite its beautiful 
blushes, Europe fell ill. Power was lost and law 
and freedom were scorned, people became 
delusionary and began to believe in superstitions 
and gods, dark and bloodthirsty. As usual, 
Zakopane survived unscathed from the Great 
War to the time of the cable car to Kasprowy. At 
the beginning of 1915, Russian patrols came to 
the foot of the Gorce hills. The Russkies lasted 
on this line until May 1915 when the German 
offensive pushed them hundreds of kilometers to 
the east.  
Out of spite for Zakopane, the First World War 
broke out in the summer season. It was a blow to 
